Introduction

A recent Constitutional Court judgment handed down on Thursday 15 May 2014
emphasises what could very well be described as a growing tendency regarding the use of the common law remedy of the mandament van spolie in post-constitutional jurisprudence, in sometimes unorthodox or unconventional contexts. 1 It is therefore not unsurprising that Sonnekus has been at pains to point out that the remedy is becoming what he has appropriately termed a Mädchen für Alle. 2 Ironically, it is becoming clear that the remedy is being used in more cases (or at least more consistently nowadays than it was before the enactment of the Constitution), despite there currently being at least two other remedial avenues that litigants can exhaust, namely statutory remedies or a constitutional remedy in terms of section 38 or 172 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). 3 One example where this has recently come up is in the Constitutional Court decision of Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security (hereafter Ngqukumba). 4 The legal question in Ngqukumba was whether the mandament van spolie -as a remedy to restore possession -can be ordered if section 68(6)(b) of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996 (hereafter the Traffic Act) prohibits possession "without lawful cause" of a motor vehicle of which the engine or chassis number has been falsified or mutilated. The conclusion of the Court was that the mandament van spolie can be  Zsa-Zsa T Boggenpoel. BComm LLB LLD (Stell) . Associate Professor in Private Law, University of Stellenbosch. Email: zsazsa@sun.ac.za. I should like to thank Juanita Pienaar, Reghard Brits and Elsabé van der Sijde for reading a draft of this note and for valuable feedback. I also wish to thank my assistant Derryn Visser for valuable research assistance. I am equally grateful for the positive comments from the reviewers of the journal. The remaining errors are my own.
granted despite the prohibition against the return of the vehicles in terms of the Traffic Act. Interestingly, the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereafter the CPA), in terms of which the seizure of these vehicles had initially taken place, actually has a built-in remedy to allow for a claim for the return of these vehicles. 5 This has prompted me to ask questions like: Why use a temporary remedy like the mandament van spolie to reclaim possession of these vehicles if the CPA has a remedy to restore possession on the one hand, and the Traffic Act precludes repossession in certain instances on the other?
The decision in Ngqukumba raises questions about the relationship between common law remedies and statutory provisions that are specifically geared towards regulating an area of law. There are interesting parallel running questions that arise in the contexts of both quasi-possession 6 and eviction 7 -that I have picked up on in earlier With regard to the use of the remedy in the case of incorporeals, especially where the supply of water is disconnected, it remains questionable in some instances whether the mandament van spolie is the appropriate remedy to restore lost possession where legislation was enacted to replace the common law or regulate the field. In this regard, s 3(1) of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997, which provides that everyone has a right of access to basic water supply, gives effect to the constitutional right to have access to sufficient water as encapsulated in s 27(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). Furthermore, s 4(3)(a) of the Water Services Act requires that the limitation or discontinuation of water services must be fair and equitable. To that end, the provisions are aimed at ensuring that fair and equitable disconnections take place and that the dispute resolution procedures in the Act are followed to ensure that disconnections are lawful. Therefore, it should in principle be impermissible to employ common law remedies if there are procedures (and remedies) in the legislation aimed at adequately balancing the rights of the water service authority and the water user. However, if the legislation does not provide adequate remedies, falling back on the existing common law as the residuary source of law is arguably more desirable than developing new constitutional remedies, which would seemingly run parallel to the extant common law ones. See also Boggenpoel 2015 TSAR 76. 7 In the context of eviction, it is important to consider whether an unlawful occupier who was illegally evicted can choose to apply for common law remedies or opt for direct reliance on constitutional rights to found constitutional remedies. It is also essential to determine in this context whether courts should deliberately be able to choose not to apply or develop the common law remedies in line with the Constitution, but instead decide to devise new constitutional remedies that again will run parallel to the common law ones. Once again, courts should probably be careful in terms of how they deal with the application of the mandament van spolie vis-à-vis constitutional remedies, especially in the absence of a specific remedy in the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 96 of 1998 (PIE) designed to restore the situations where local authorities evict illegally without following the procedures in the Act. See Boggenpoel and Pienaar De Jure 998-1021; Boggenpoel 2014 Stell LR 72-98. research -though I do not specifically intend to deal with those aspects in this note.
Suffice it to say that the questions asked in relation to the protection of incorporeals with the mandament van spolie and regarding the protection afforded by the remedy in the context of the unlawful occupation of land emerge again in the light of
Ngqukumba.
The Ngqukumba judgment shows that the appropriate relationship between the existing common law remedies and statutory provisions should be re-evaluated.
Significantly, I think Ngqukumba creates the impression that the use or application of the spoliation remedy -and probably by implication common law remedies in general -remains largely unaffected by the CPA (which has an alternative, arguably casespecific, remedy) and the Traffic Act (which specifically prevents the return of vehicles in certain cases).
My preliminary hypothesis is that the mandament van spolie may have cleverly been used to circumvent a line of Supreme Court of Appeal decisions that attempted to provide clarity about the return of so-called tampered vehicles in terms of the statutory remedy in the CPA. In order to prove this, I will firstly begin by providing a synopsis of the main points of the decision. I would then like to back-track a couple of years and investigate how these problems were solved without (or before) resort to the mandament van spolie -and why I think this common law lifeline may have been cleverly used, potentially as a second best option, where the statutory remedies were categorically denied by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the light of the Traffic Act.
Finally, I will provide some observations about the outcome of this decision -especially in terms of the broader implications for the way legislative interventions may have had an impact on extant common law remedies.
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The facts of Ngqukumba In short, the central question before the Constitutional Court in Ngqukumba was whether it is possible to use the mandament van spolie to reclaim possession of these so-called tampered vehicles. 10 The facts that gave rise to this judgment can briefly be described as follows: On 10
February 2010 a suspect provided the police with information concerning the possibility that the appellant's taxi was a stolen vehicle. The taxi -which was standing in a taxi rank in Mthatha at the time -was pointed out by the suspect to the police, and the driver of the taxi was ordered to take the vehicle to the police station. The police then inspected the taxi and discovered that the vehicle's chassis number had apparently been removed from another vehicle and placed on the appellant's one. The police also found that the engine number of the appellant's taxi had been ground off and that the manufacturer's tag plate had been removed from another vehicle and placed on the appellant's taxi. The taxi was therefore a "tampered vehicle" for the purposes of the Traffic Act and consequently it had been retained by the police. The vehicle had been searched and seized without a valid warrant.
The appellant applied to the Eastern Cape High Court for the return of the vehicle on the basis of the mandament van spolie. The court held that although both requirements of the remedy, namely peaceful and undisturbed possession and unlawful dispossession, had been complied with, the remedy could not be granted because section 68 (6) In the Constitutional Court, Madlanga J granted leave to appeal and highlighted that it was in the interest of justice for the Constitutional Court to pronounce on a number of constitutional issues that arose in this case. The legal issues were deemed to be of a constitutional nature and included the statutory interpretation relating to possession in a way that complies with section 39 (2) and (3) precludes the restoration of possession in proceedings for a spoliation order.
The Court began by considering whether sections 68(6)(b) and 89(1) of the Traffic Act preclude, and therefore forms a valid defence against, a spoliation order. 12 In this regard Madlanga J first emphasised the underlying philosophy and main purpose of the remedy, which is to preserve the "public order by restraining persons from taking the law into their own hands and by inducing them to follow due process". 13 The Court stressed that the remedy can be granted against an individual or government who fails to take recourse to a court of law to enforce rights, but rather resorts to self-help instead. 14 Consequently, when government entities resort to acts of self-help, the rule Ngqukumba para 10. Impossibility of restoration is commonly recognised as a defence against a spoliation order. Impossibility implies that repossession of the spoliated property is unlikely for some reason. In some instances, it might be impossible to return the thing because it does not exist anymore or the property may have been irreparably damaged or harmed. In other cases, the defence of impossibility may be raised because the property may have been alienated to a bona fide third party subsequent to the dispossession, making restoration impossible. The impossibility defence could also possibly arise (as in Ngqukumba) because the spoliator's possession of the property is unlawful or illegal. In other words, the argument is that impossibility of restoration can be raised as a valid defence in the case where possession of the property is illegal and the spoliation order is denied because section 68 (6) of law (a founding value of the Constitution) can be vindicated by using the mandament van spolie. 15 In other words, if the police purport to act in terms of the CPA to seize someone's property, then they are required to comply with the provisions of the Act. The principle of legality will be undermined if organs of state act outside of the provisions of the alleged Act. For purposes of the mandament van spolie, the seizing of someone's goods is therefore unlawful if the provisions of the CPA were not complied with. Consequently, the remedy is available in principle in instances where the police acted outside of the ambit of legislation and seized goods without the necessary warrant. According to the court's reasoning, the person from whom the vehicles were seized may then use the spoliation remedy to resume control of the vehicles. This seems to be the case, even despite there actually being a remedy in the CPA to claim the return of the vehicle. I return to this point, and the concern that I have in this regard, later on in the note.
The conclusion up to this point was that the remedy is available in principle in these instances. The Court then proceeded to question whether the remedy can nonetheless be denied, as the restoration of possession was impossible because of the statutory provisions preventing the re-possession of the vehicle in the light of the Traffic Act.
Madlanga J rejected this impossibility argument for the following two reasons: firstly, the Constitutional Court disagreed with the Supreme Court of Appeal's premise that a vehicle that had been tampered with -and was therefore suspect in terms of section 68(6)(b) of the Traffic Act -was the same as an article which would per se be unlawful to possess under all circumstances, for instance heroin or a machine gun, which someone may not lawfully possess. 16 With regard to per se illegal objects, possession of which can never be lawful, the court emphasised that had it been concerned with objects of that nature, the mandament van spolie may well not have been available. 17 Consequently, the Court took the view that in relation to tampered vehicles, which can in principle be possessed if there is lawful cause for their possession, the application of the remedy was not completely barred. Furthermore, the Court held that where the possibility of using the mandament van spolie still existed (in other words, where it was uncertain whether the individual might or might not have a lawful cause to possess the tampered vehicle), sections 68(6)(b) and 89(1) should be read in a manner that conformed with the common law and the statutory provisions should not be read so as to oust the operation of the remedy in principle. 18 The mandament van spolie should therefore be granted and a court on another day in a separate enquiry into the merits of the dispute had to decide whether or not the applicant had a lawful cause to possess the vehicle. The court in this matter should be interested only in restoring possession before all else, provided the requirements of the remedy had been complied with. The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal was consequently set aside and the police were ordered to return the vehicle to the appellant.
Analysis of Ngqukumba
The Court's conclusion that the spoliation remedy would be available even though the CPA contains a remedy to claim the property back is noteworthy and warrants further discussion. This conclusion -namely that the spoliation remedy can appropriately be used where the state acts outside of the provisions of the CPA -raises questions about the continued reliance on the common law in instances where an appropriate remedy may already exist in the legislation aimed at regulating the field. The use of the mandament van spolie in this context is arguably controversial. The use of the spoliation remedy becomes especially problematic in cases where the legislation says nothing about the possibility of bringing a cause of action on the basis of common law was prohibited from being in possession of the property, irrespective of whether the claimant would have in principle been able to comply with the requirements of acquisitive prescription, because possession of the property was illegal. Similarly, a claim based on the mandament van spolie should fail if a claimant is not able to possess property due to the illegality of possession, irrespective of whether or not the claimant is able to prove the two requirements of the remedy in principle.
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In this regard, the Court pointed out that the statutory provisions should not be read so as to oust the operation of the remedy, because "[r]eading sections 68(6)(b) and 89(1) in a manner that ousts the mandament van spolie may lead to a culture of impunity amongst police", whichaccording to the court -is at odds with constitutionalism. See Ngqukumba para 20.
remedies as opposed to the legislative ones. It is in these instances that the possibility arises that more than one source of law can provide a remedy in the particular case and the inconsistency in the approach to remedies becomes evident. Furthermore, the remedy is not specifically aimed at protecting rights with regard to property. 28 Therefore, it is clear to see why the remedy is such a striking option in these instances. However, it should be mentioned that the Supreme Court of Appeal The appellant's possession of the vehicle for now -until such time as a police clearance is issued and the vehicle is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Act -will thus be unlawful according to the criminal law. The police cannot lawfully release the vehicle to the appellant, whether he is the owner or erstwhile lawful possessor thereof. An order by a court that it be done will be no different than ordering a person to be restored in the possession of his or her heroin or machine gun which he or she may not lawfully possess. ... To my mind, that finally illustrates why the Ivanov approach cannot be sustained.
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Notwithstanding that rationale, the Constitutional Court in Ngqukumba granted the mandament van spolie and consequently reverted to the same type of thinking as the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ivanov. Therefore, the spoliation remedy can be used to claim the return of tampered vehicles despite the existence of legislation specifically prohibiting the return thereof. I should mention that the Constitutional Court in Ngqukumba did have a slightly more nuanced approach to the application of the mandament in instances where legislation prohibits the return of vehicles. 30 The court reasoned that where there is an absolute prohibition against the return of vehicles, the mandament may very well be excluded, for instance as in the machine gun and heroin examples. It is questionable whether the court -in the process of distinguishing between objects that may in principle be possessed lawfully and those which can never be possessed lawfully -actually ventured into territory forbidden by the mandament van spolie. In this regard, it may be argued that the court considered the merits of the dispute when it questioned the type of (unlawful) possession that would form a defence against the application of the remedy. The question concerning the merits of the dispute relates to an instance where a court considers competing claims to title in the decision of whether the remedy can be granted specifically with regard to the first requirement of the remedy. However, that is not what the court would be doing when it considers whether possession of an article is prohibited in terms of legislation. In Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security [2013] ZASCA 89 (31 May 2013) para 14 the court appropriately explained that "[i]t is not the requirements of the mandament van spolie that were in issue in Ivanov, nor are they any longer in issue in this appeal. There are also no competing claims to possession of the vehicle in question by the respondents. The provisions of s 68(6)(b) of the Act prohibit the appellant from being in possession of the vehicle which he might otherwise lawfully possess." Therefore, although it may seem as though the court is taking the merits into account in the particular, I would argue that one should not reach that conclusion too quickly. The court actually carved out a category of potential unlawful (or perhaps better, illegal) possessors to whom the mandament may be unavailable because legislation prohibits possession of the articles subject to the legislation. See note 18 above. These cases dealt with a claim based on the return of the vehicles in terms the statutory remedy in the CPA. However, these decisions provide authority for the fact that repossession is not possible because section 68(6) of the Traffic Act specifically prohibits it. In this regard, Lewis JA and Meer AJA in Pakule and Tafeni attempted to provide finality in the matter and concluded that:
In light of the decisions of this court there can and should no longer be any doubt that a vehicle seized by the police cannot be returned to persons from whom they have seized if any of the features referred to in s 68(6) of the National Road Traffic Act are present. 39 Therefore, in essence the door was closed and the matter purportedly settled insofar as the statutory remedy in the CPA could have been used to circumvent the Traffic Act. Stated differently, to the extent that the statutory framework was enacted to regulate (or was geared towards regulating) the specific field, the Supreme Court of In relation to the second question, namely whether or not it is necessary to regulate the choice of remedy where the possibility arises that more than one remedy could be a viable option, I should like to make two closing remarks. Firstly, although I see the benefit of using the spoliation remedy in this context, I would err on the side of caution when it comes to using the mandament van spolie in cases where legislation exists to regulate the field. The uncertainty around which remedy to use in these instances has resulted in incoherent and confusing jurisprudence on specific topics. 42 In some instances it is unclear what the rationale is behind choosing one remedy as opposed to another -it seems to be done in a mostly random, ad-hoc manner. It is on this basis that Van der Walt suggests the subsidiarity approach, which aims to indicate the point of departure that should be used when deciding which source of law to turn to when a dispute arises. 43 This is also the basis on which Davis has criticised the courts for failing to give any indication of how to determine when it is necessary to develop the common law or to follow an applicable statute as well as the interrelationship between the two systems. 44 It is particularly problematic if the common law remedy is simply being used to bypass the purpose that the legislation seeks to achieve. In other words, if the legislation aims to prevent a certain mischief one should not be able to use the common law Therefore, the appropriate relationship between the legislation and the common law is set out in principle. There is also a body of case law dealing with the implications of The Court's conclusion that the mandament van spolie is in principle available in these instances creates the impression that the common law remedy would be appropriate even though the CPA contains a remedy to claim the property back. This conclusion is problematic. I argue that if the CPA has a remedy to restore possession, that option should first be exhausted. In this regard, I contend that it is necessary to regulate the choice of remedy if both the common law and the legislation provide remedies to vindicate the violations of rights. I also assert that in instances where legislation has been enacted to regulate a specific area of the law (or to give effect to a constitutional provision) the mandament van spolie should in principle not be available. A legislative or constitutional remedy may be more favourable in these instances, because there are considerations that can be taken into account in terms of a statutory (or constitutional) remedy, which will not (necessarily) be taken into consideration in 
